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A Cournot duopoly game is an oligopoly market with two
players. Oligopoly was ﬁrst introduced by Cournot [1]. In a
typical Cournot oligopoly, there are two or more players, no
other players can enter the market, and collusive behavior is
prohibited. Each player in the oligopoly market aims to max-
imize its expected proﬁt, and proﬁt is maximized when mar-
ginal revenue equals marginal cost. Recently, it has also been
shown that even oligopolistic markets may become chaotic un-
der certain conditions [2–10]. In general, in order to adjust his
output, a player can choose his expectation rule among many
available strategies. Naive, adaptive, boundedly rational andlocal approximation expectations are only a few examples. In
the literature on oligopoly games, most papers focus on games
with homogeneous strategies, that is, players who adopt the
same expectation rule. Another branch of the literature is
made up of studies in which games with different strategies
are taken into consideration. The assumption of players adopt-
ing heterogeneous rules to decide their production is, in our
opinion, more realistic than the opposite case. This approach
characterizes the works by Leonard and Nishimura [11],
Den-Haan [12], Agiza et al. [13], Agiza and Elsadany [14,15].
Zhang et al. [16] used the technique of Agiza and Elsadany
to analyze a duopoly game with heterogeneous players and
nonlinear cost function. Angelini et al. [17] and Tramontana
[18] studied a duopoly game with heterogeneous ﬁrms assum-
ing a microfounded nonlinearity on the demand function.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamic
behavior and control of duopoly game with different strategies.
We considered that each player forms a different strategy in or-
der to compute its expected output. We assume that the ﬁrst
player represents a boundedly rational player and the second
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this work is to investigate the dynamic behaviors of the two play-
ers game using different expectation rules. Moreover, from a
mathematical point of view, it is shown that the loss of the mar-
ket equilibrium stability may occur through a ﬂip bifurcation
and that a cascade of ﬂip bifurcationsmay lead to periodic cycles
and chaos.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
a nonlinear duopoly game model. In Section 3 we study the
ﬁxed points and the dynamics of the model, showing explicit
parametric conditions of the existence and local stability of
the market equilibrium. Section 4 the results of the previous
section are numerically illustrated and showing the occurrence
of complex behaviors. In Section 5, we exerted control on the
duopoly game model. Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
We consider a duopoly Cournot game where xti ; i ¼ 1; 2 repre-
sent the quantity supplied by ith player during period
t ¼ 0; 1; 2 . . ..Assume that the inverse demand function [19,20] is
pðXÞ ¼ a b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X
p
ð1Þ
whereX ¼ x1 þ x2 is the total quantity in themarket, a and b are
positive constants. This function is convex as the isoelastic de-
mand function but it does not tend to inﬁnity as p! 0. In fact,
ða=bÞ2 represents the maximum amount of output that can be
brought to the market. Those properties are important/relevant
from an economic point of view. Moreover this form has also
used in others oligopoly models and in laboratory experiments
economics dealing with learning and expectations formation
(see e.g. [21–23]). The cost function of the players is as follows:
CiðxiÞ ¼ cixi; i ¼ 1; 2: ð2Þ
where the positive parameters ci are the marginal costs. The
proﬁt function of player i is
Piðx1; x2Þ ¼ xi a b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X
p 
 cixi; i ¼ 1; 2: ð3Þ
From the proﬁt maximization by player i, the marginal
proﬁts are obtained as:
Ui ¼ @Pi
@xi
¼ a ci  b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X
p
 bxi
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X
p ; i ¼ 1; 2 ð4Þ
We assume different expectations: i.e., player 1 is boundedly
rational and player 2 is local approximation. The boundedly
rational player 1 has no complete knowledge of the market;
hence they try to use local information based on the marginal
proﬁt @P1
@x1
. It decides to increase (decrease) its quantity if it has
a positive (negative) marginal proﬁt. This adjustment mecha-
nism has been called myopic by Dixit [2]. Thus, the dynamic
adjustment mechanism can be modeled as follows:
xtþ11 ¼ xt1 þ a1xt1
@p1 xt1; x
t
2
 
@xt1
; ð5Þ
where a1 is a positive parameter which represents the speed of
adjustment of ﬁrst player.
The second duopolist is a local approximation player (see
[19,23]), i.e.
xtþ12 ¼
xtþ12
2
þ c1  fðX
tÞ
2f0ðXtÞ ð6ÞTherefore, given these types of strategies formation, the
two-dimensional system that characterizes the dynamics of a
Cournot duopoly game is the following:
xtþ11 ¼ xt1 þ a1xt1 a c1  b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
xt1 þ xt2
p  bxt1
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
xt
1
þxt
2
p
 
xtþ12 ¼
2ðac2Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
xt
1
þxt
2
p
2bxt1bxt2
2b
8><
>: ð7Þ
We are interested only in positive trajectories. Note also that
the game is not deﬁned in the origin (0,0). In the next section,
we study the dynamical behaviors of the map (7).
3. Equilibrium points and local stability
In this section, we determine the equilibrium points of the map
(7) by solving the following nonlinear algebraic system:
x1 a c1  b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x1 þ x2
p  bx1
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x
1
þx
2
p
 
¼ 0
2ða c2Þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃx1 þ x2p  2bx1  3bx2 ¼ 0
8<
: ð8Þ
This map has two equilibrium points:
E1 ¼ 0; 4ða c2Þ
2
9b2
 !
ð9Þ
E2 ¼ x1; x2
 
where
x1 ¼
4ð2a c1  c2Þðaþ 2c2  3c1Þ
25b2
; x2 ¼
4ð2a c1  c2Þðaþ 2c1  3c2Þ
25b2
ð10Þ
E2 is called Nash equilibrium point and has positive coordi-
nates provided that
2a > c1 þ c2
a > 3c1  2c2
a > 3c2  2c1
8><
>: ð11Þ
In order to investigate the local stability of the equilibrium
points, we must consider the Jacobian matrix of the map (7) is
the following:
J¼ 1þ a1 a c1 b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X
p  bx1
2
ﬃﬃ
X
p  3bx21þ4bx1x2
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X3
p
	 
 a1 bx
2
1þ2bx1x2ð Þ
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X3
p
ac2
2b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x1þx2
p  1 ac2
2b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x1þx2
p  1
2
2
64
3
75
ð12Þ
The equilibrium points will be stable if the eigenvalues ki,
i ¼ 1; 2 of the above Jacobian matrix satisfy inequalities
kij j < 1; i ¼ 1; 2. By applying the stability condition to the
equilibrium E1 we have the following result:
Proposition 1. If the Nash equilibrium E2 is strictly positive,
then the equilibrium point E1 is a saddle point.Proof. In fact at E1, the Jacobian matrix becomes a triangular
matrix:
JðE1Þ ¼ 1þ a1
ðaþ2c23c1Þ
3
0
1
4
1
4
" #
whose eigenvalues are given by the diagonal entries. They are
k1 ¼ 1þ a1 ðaþ2c23c1Þ3 and k2 ¼ 14 . If the Nash equilibrium point
58 A.A. Elsadanyhas positive coordinates, then a > 3c1  2c2, hence jk1j > 1
and jk2j < 1. Then E1 is a saddle point. hFigure 1 Bifurcation diagram of the model (7) with respect to a1.3.1. Stability of the Nash equilibrium point E2
In order to investigate the local stability properties of the Nash
equilibrium point (10) of the two-dimensional system (7), the
Jacobian matrix evaluated at E2, that is:
JðE2Þ ¼
1 a1 3bx
2
1 þ4bx1x2ð Þ
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X3
p  a1 bx
2
1 þ2bx1x2ð Þ
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X3
p
ac2
2b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x
1
þx
2
p  1 ac2
2b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x
1
þx
2
p  1
2
2
64
3
75 ð13Þ
where X ¼ x1 þ x2.
Whose trace and determinant are given by:
T :¼TrðJðE2ÞÞ¼ 1
2
a1hþ/
D :¼DetðJðE2ÞÞ¼/1
2
a1w/þa1r
where
h¼ 3bx
2
1 þ4bx1x2
 
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X3
p ;/¼ a c2
2b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X
p ;w¼ bx
2
1 þbx1x2
 
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X3
p ð14Þ
and r¼ bx
2
1
8
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X3
p
so the characteristic polynomial of (13) is:
PðkÞ ¼ k2  TkþD; ð15Þ
whose discriminant is D ¼ T2  4D.
From the stability theory we know that the ﬁxed point E2 is
locally asymptotically stable as long as the eigenvalues of Jaco-
bian matrix JðE2Þare inside the unit circle of the complex
plane. This is true if and only if the following Jury’s [24] stabil-
ity criteria are hold:
ð1Þ : F :¼ 1þ TþD > 0;
ð2Þ : TC :¼ 1 TþD > 0;
ð3Þ : H :¼ 1D > 0:
8><
>: ð16Þ
The above inequalities (16) deﬁne a region in which the Nash
equilibrium point E2 is local stable. The violation of any sin-
gle inequality in (16), with other two being simultaneously ful-
ﬁlled leads to: (1) a ﬂip bifurcation (real eigenvalue that passes
through 1) when F ¼ 0; (2) a fold or transcritical bifurcation
(a real eigenvalue that passes through +1) when TC ¼ 0; (3) a
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation (i.e., the modulus of a complex
eigenvalue pair that passes through 1) when H ¼ 0 and
Tj j < 2 (see [25,26]).
The discriminant of (13) is
D ¼ T2  4D ¼ 3
2
 a1h /
 2
þ 2a1ð2w/ 2h/þ h 2rÞ;
From Eqs. (10), (11), (14) and since a; b; c1; c2 and a1 are posi-
tive parameters. Then w > h and h > 2r. Hence D > 0, then
the eigenvalues of Nash equilibrium are real.
For the special case of the Jacobian matrix (13), the stabil-
ity conditions in (16) can be written as follows:
ð1Þ : F :¼ 1 a1hþ 2/ a1w/þ a1r > 0;
ð2Þ : TC :¼ a1hþ a1r a1w/ > 0;
ð3Þ : H :¼ 3
2
 /þ a1w/ a1r > 0:
8><
>: ð17ÞSince the discriminant is positive, the existence of complex
eigenvalues of JðE2Þ is prevented. Then the condition (3) is
always fulﬁlled. While from Eqs. (10), (11) and (14) it is clear
that the condition (2) is satisﬁed. Therefore, the Nash equilib-
rium point E2 can loose stability only through a ﬂip bifurca-
tion. So, we have the following proposition about local
stability of Nash Equilibrium point E2.
Proposition 2. The Nash equilibrium point E2 is asymptotically
stable if a < 1þ2/wþ/hr. The system (7) undergoes a ﬂip bifurcation
at E2 when a ¼ 1þ2/wþ/hr. Moreover, period-2 points bifurcate
from E2 when a >
1þ2/
wþ/hr.
Proof. From above results, the conditions (2) and (3) are
always satisﬁed. However, condition (1) can be violated, since
the ﬂip bifurcation occurs when F ¼ 0. Then
1þ TþD ¼ 0;
1 a1hþ 2/ a1w/þ a1r ¼ 0
Then from stability situation, the Nash equilibrium point can
loose stability when a ¼ 1þ2/wþ/hr . Hence the Nash equilibrium
point is asymptotically stable if a < a. Moreover, period-2
points bifurcate from E2 when a > a. h
Next we present the results of the numerical simulations for
the system (7).
4. Analysis and numerical simulation
The main purpose of this section is to show that the qualitative
behavior of the solutions of the nonlinear duopoly game with
heterogeneous players (described by the dynamic system (7)).
To provide some numerical evidence for the existence of chaotic
motions, we use several standard tools, bifurcations diagrams,
basin of attraction, lyapunov exponents, strange attractors, sen-
sitive dependence on initial conditions and so on.
Fig. 1 presents a bifurcation diagram of system (7) in
ða1  x1x2Þ plane when a ¼ 10; b ¼ 1; c1 ¼ 1 and c2 ¼ 3. From
Fig. 1, we can see that the orbit with initial values ð0:25; 0:2Þ
approaches to the stable ﬁxed point for a1 < 0:415. With a1
increasing, a ﬂip bifurcation for system (7) takes place at a1
¼ 0:415 and period-2 points bifurcate as a1 ¼ :415 , which is
veriﬁes Proposition 2. Furthermore, the period-2 points are
attracting when a1varies in the interval ð0:415; 0:565Þ. As long
Figure 4 Bifurcation diagram of the model (7) with respect to c1.
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becomes unstable and the bifurcation scenario occurs and ulti-
mately leads to unpredictable (chaotic) motions that are ob-
served. This means that immediately after the NS bifurcation
the system displays complicated dynamics, differently from
what happens after the period doubling bifurcation in which
aperiodic attractor appears. While bifurcation and chaos oc-
cur, the output of players acutely ﬂuctuate making it difﬁcult
for players to forecast their output and to make decisions in
the future.
In order to classify the dynamic behavior of system (7) for
many different parameters set, we compute the largest lyapunov
exponent. Fig. 2 shows the largest lyapunov exponent corre-
sponding to the bifurcation diagram Fig. 1. As it is positive,
there is evidence of chaos and beyond that it is even possible
to differentiate between cycles of very high order and aperiodic
(chaotic) behavior of the system. Moreover, by comparing the
standard bifurcation diagram in Fig. 1 with the diagram of larg-
est lyapunov exponent, one can obtain a better understanding of
the particular properties of the dynamic behavior of the system.
Fig. 3 shows the bifurcation diagram with respect to the
parameter a with b ¼ 1; c1 ¼ 1; c2 ¼ 3 and a1 ¼ 0:6. The Nash
equilibrium E2 is locally stable for small values of a. As a
increases, the Nash equilibrium point becomes unstable and
complex dynamic behavior occurs, including higher-order
cycles and chaos. The bifurcation diagram with respect to c1Figure 2 Largest Lyapunov exponents corresponding to Fig.1.
Figure 3 Bifurcation diagram of the model (7) with respect to a.
Figure 5 Strange attractor for the model (7).when the other parameters take the values ða; b; c2; a1Þ ¼
ð10; 1; 3; 0:6Þ is given Fig. 4. We can see that the system dynam-
ics is chaotic if the return rate c1 is small. As c1 increases, there
exist period-halving bifurcations. The game experiences chaos
and period-halving bifurcation.
A strange attractor is another characteristic of chaos of the
system, and it reﬂects the inherent regularity of the complex
phenomena in a chaotic state. Thus, players can forecast the
market output in a short term according to inherent regularity
while the system is in a chaotic state. Fig. 5 shows the graph of
strange attractors of system (7) when a ¼ 10; b ¼ 1; c1 ¼ 1;
c2 ¼ 3 and a1 ¼ 0:6. Strange attractors show the complexity
of players dynamic output competition in chaos.
5. Chaos control
The appearance of chaos in the economic system is not ex-
pected and even is harmful. Thus, people hope to ﬁnd some
methods to control the chaos of economic system. A wide vari-
ety of methods have been proposed for controlling chaos in
oligopoly models, for example, chaos control with OGY meth-
od in the Kopel duopoly game model was applied in [27],
chaos control with modiﬁed straight-line stabilization method
Figure 7 Time series of system (18) when control parameter
l ¼ 0:3.
60 A.A. Elsadanyin an output duopoly competing evolution model have been
studied by Du et al. [28], Holyst and Urbanowicz [29] had
studied chaos control with time-delayed feedback method in
an economical model. The dynamics and adaptive control of
a duopoly advertising model based on heterogeneous expecta-
tions is presented in Ding et al. [30], and so on. Elabbasy et al.
[31] have considered such a feedback control in their triopoly
with heterogeneous players. Also Ding et al. [32] have applied
feedback control on multi-team Bertrand model.
The above section results show that the duopoly market
will become unstable and fall into chaos when output adjust-
ment speed parameter out of the stable region. Therefore, it
is necessary to take a control strategy to delay or eliminate
the occurrence of bifurcation and chaos. Feedback and param-
eter variation are two methods for the chaos control. Recently,
Luo et al. [33] proposed a new control method which is called
as control strategy of the state variables feedback and param-
eter variation. Pu and Ma [34] have considered the state vari-
ables feedback and parameter variation method in their four
oligopolist model. In this article, the same method will be used
to control the chaos of system (7). We change two-dimensional
discrete dynamic system (7) into the following format:xtþ11 ¼ð1lÞ xt1þa1xt1 ac1b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
xt1þxt2
p  bxt1
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
xt
1
þxt
2
p
 
 
þlxt1
xtþ12 ¼ð1lÞ
2ðac2Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
xt
1
þxt
2
p
2bxt1bxt2
2b

 
þlxt2
8>><
>>:
ð18ÞSystem (7) will fall into instability region and chaos with the
change of output modiﬁcation speed for player 1. The chaotic
state of system (7) with the change of speed adjustment a1 for
player 1 is controlled. Fig. 6 is the bifurcation diagram of con-
trolled system (18) with the change of control parameter l
after adding control to the chaotic state (a¼ 10; b¼ 1; c1¼ 1;
c2¼ 3 and a1¼ 0:6). It can be seen from Fig. 6 that the system
(18) is in a chaotic state when l< 0:0465; the ﬁrst players
output and the second players output are controlled in the
four-fold period bifurcation state when l¼ 0:0475. The ﬁrst
player output and the second player output are controlled in
the period-doubling bifurcation when l¼ 0:0875. Also, the
period-doubling bifurcation disappears, and the system stabi-
lizes at the Nash equilibrium point when l> 0:27. Fig. 7 shows
that the chaotic system is controlled at ﬁxed point whenFigure 6 Bifurcation diagram of system (18) with respect to
control parameter l.l¼ 0:3. Thus chaos control is successful. The method pre-
sented here can be applied to many chaotic dynamical systems.
6. Conclusion
A Cournot duopoly game model with different strategies is
analyzed. The stability of the equilibrium points has been ana-
lyzed. From bifurcation diagrams and phase portraits, the ba-
sic properties of the game are presents. The results show that
the quantity adjustment speed of boundedly rational player
has an obvious impact on the stability of the players’ dynamic
quantity competition model. When it continues to increase, a
series of chaotic phenomena occur: period doubling bifurca-
tion, a positive Lyapunov exponent and strange attractors
have been obtained. Finally, the model is quickly arrived at
the Nash equilibrium point when a suitable controlling factor
is chosen.
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